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Internet Indecency and Minors: The Case
for Parental and School Responsibility not
Congressional Regulation
Eric J. Segall*
At the end of its opinion in Ashcroft v. ACLU,' upholding a lower
court's preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Child
Online Protection Act ("COPA"), the Court explained that its holding did
not prevent Congress from "enacting any regulation of the Internet
'2
designed to protect minors from gaining access to harmful materials.
Perhaps the Court thought it necessary to send this unusual message
because Congress, when enacting COPA, paid careful attention to a prior
Supreme Court case,3 which had invalidated a similar statute on the
grounds that it violated the First Amendment. 4 In Ashcroft, the Court did
not ignore Congress' efforts to comply with the Court's earlier opinion:
In enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to our earlier
decisions on this subject, in particular the decision in [Reno v.
ACLU]. For that reason, the Judiciary must proceed with caution
and.., with care before invalidating the Act. The imperative of
according respect to Congress, however, does not permit us to depart
from well-established First Amendment principles. Instead,
we must
5
hold the Government to its constitutional burden of proof.
The thesis of this essay is that, contrary to the Court's statement that
Congress could constitutionally enact a statute protecting minors from
sexually explicit materials on the Internet, the government's "burden of
proof' under the First Amendment will and should preclude any such
effort. As a predictive matter, the Court that affirmed the injunction
* Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. I would like to thank Russ
Weaver for putting together this wonderful symposium, and the other participants who
commented on an earlier draft of this essay.

1. 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
2. Id. at 672.
3.
4.
5.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Id. at 878.
Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660.
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against COPA is unlikely to affirm a broader statute, and a narrower
statute is difficult to imagine. As a normative matter, Congress should
leave it up to parents, schools, and public libraries to police what
children should and should not view on the Internet.
The first part of this essay summarizes Congress' efforts to protect
children from harmful Internet speech and the Court's responses to those
laws. The second half explains why Congress should halt any further
efforts to regulate sexually explicit materials on the Internet.
I.

Background

As the Internet expanded during the 1990's, Congress became
concerned about the ability of children to access sexually explicit
materials.6
In response to this problem, Congress enacted the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"),7 which made it a crime to
knowingly transmit over the Internet to any person under eighteen any
indecent or obscene materials or any material that depicted or described
sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms patently offensive to
local community standards. 8 The CDA allowed for two affirmative
defenses for those who took "good faith, reasonable, effective, and
appropriate actions" to restrict the covered communications to adults,
and for those who restricted access to the covered materials by requiring
proof of age such as credit cards or adult identification numbers. 9
In a decision written by Justice Stevens, on behalf of the entire
Court except Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, the Court struck down
the CDA saying that the statute was facially overbroad (it covered
everything on the Web, including e-mail and chat rooms), that it was
impermissibly vague because it failed to adequately define key
definitional terms such as indecency, and that the affirmative defenses in
10
the Act would be expensive and burdensome for many Internet users.
The Reno Court distinguished Ginsberg v. New York," which upheld a
state law prohibiting the sale of indecent (but not necessarily obscene)
materials to minors, on the following four grounds: 1) the statute in
Ginsberg did not "bar parents who so desire from purchasing the
magazines for their children"; 2) the Ginsberg law only applied to
commercial transactions; 3) the Ginsberg law defined the illegal
6.
Attempt
(2004).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Emily Vander Wilt, Considering COPA: A Look at Congress's Second
to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 373, 376
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2003).
Wilt, supra note 6, at 376.
See Reno, 521 U.S. at 860-61.
See Wilt, supra note 6, at 378.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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materials as those "utterly without redeeming social importance for
minors"; and 4) the Ginsberg law applied to any person
under seventeen
2
whereas the CDA applied to everyone under eighteen. 1
The Court also distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,13 which
upheld a FCC sanction against the transmission over the radio of George
Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue during a time when children were
likely to be listening. 14 The Court in Reno stated that there were several
differences between the agency action in Pacifica and the CDA. The
order in Pacifica only limited the timing of the prohibition; it did not
impose criminal sanctions, and it involved radio broadcasts that because
of wavelength scarcity5 had traditionally been given limited First
Amendment protection.
After the Court struck down the CDA on grounds of vagueness and
overbreadth, Congress went back to work and tried to fix the statute to
address the Court's concerns. It passed COPA, which prohibits the
transmission for "commercial purposes" of World Wide Web content
that is "harmful to minors. 16 COPA defines "minors" as anyone
seventeen or under.' 7 The law also provides for affirmative defenses if
the person who transmits illegal materials to minors has restricted access
age, credit
to those materials by requiring use of a digital certificate of
8
measures.'
reasonable
other
any
by
or
account,
card or debit
In passing COPA, Congress paid careful attention to the Court's
decision in Reno. First, the law only applies to Internet materials
distributed for commercial purposes, 9 addressing the Reno Court's
concern that the affirmative defenses in the CDA 20 would have been
expensive for non-commercial web users.2 ' Second, COPA only applies
to the World Wide Web 22 whereas the CDA applied to the entire Internet,
including e-mails and chat rooms.23 This narrowing of the statute's reach
made COPA less broad and also made the affirmative defenses more
Third, COPA only applies to people
technologically possible.24
seventeen and under, 25 which responds to the Reno Court's concern 26 that
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 865-66.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id.at 742-51.
See Wilt, supra note 6, at 378.
47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1998).
§ 231(e)(7).
§ 231(c)(1).
§ 231(a)(1).
See § 233(e).
See Wilt, supra note 6, at 379-80.
47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1).
Wilt, supra note 6, at 379.
Id.
§ 231(e)(7).
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the CDA applied to people only one year away from becoming an
adult. 27 Finally, Congress defined indecency with more precision in
COPA than it had in the CDA by employing the Miller test 28 as applied
to minors. 29 There is no doubt that Congress made a good faith effort to
comply with the Court's decision in Reno when it passed the narrower
statute.3 °
Immediately after COPA became law, it was challenged by a group
of plaintiffs including Internet providers and the ACLU. 3 1 The
complicated and tortured history of that litigation is summarized in the
Ashcroft decision, and there is no reason to recount it in detail here.32
Eventually, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's injunction.3 3
The Court held that plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable probability that
they would prevail on the merits because filtering software would be a
less restrictive alternative to the sanctions in the statute, and therefore the
law was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest. 34 Putting the burden of proof on the government to demonstrate
that filtering software would be less effective than COPA's restrictions,
the Court concluded that:
Filters are less restrictive than COPA. They impose selective
restrictions on speech at the receiving end not universal restrictions at
the source. Under a filtering regime, adults without children may
gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to
identify themselves or provide credit card information. Even adults
with children may obtain access to the same speech on the same
terms simply by turning off the filter.... Above all, promoting the
use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category of speech,
and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much
diminished. All of these things are true, moreover, regardless
35 of how
broadly or narrowly the definitions in COPA are construed.
Although the Court upheld the lower court's preliminary injunction
of COPA, it did remand the case in order to allow the government to
present evidence that filtering software would not be a less restrictive
alternative to COPA's sanctions. 36 As of this writing, the lower court's
26.
27.
28.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 844, 865-66.
See Wilt, supra note 6, at 380.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).

29. Wilt, supra note 6, at 399.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
Id. at 663.
See id. at 663-64.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 671.
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injunction is still in effect.
II.

Indecency, The Internet and Minors

Congress' desire that children be shielded from sexually explicit
Internet materials is understandable. Society undoubtedly has an interest
in how young people, especially teenagers, act sexually, and their
decisions may be influenced by what they view on the Internet. The
Court has repeatedly held that the state has a compelling interest in
keeping minors away from sexually explicit images. This essay will
assume for sake of argument that such materials may cause harm to
children.
The problems with congressional regulation of these materials,
however, are numerous. Broadly speaking, there are two major obstacles
to such legislation. First, it is virtually impossible to design a scheme of
regulation of sexually explicit but non-obscene Internet materials that
will not impinge on the First Amendment rights of adults. Second, it will
be extremely difficult to design such a scheme, and implement it
constitutionally, without depriving children of information that is
important and protected by the First Amendment. As a predictive matter,
it is unlikely that Congress can draft a statute that a majority of the Court
will find consistent with the First Amendment. As a normative matter,
any such statute would do more harm than good. This essay will discuss
those two points separately.
A.

What Will Happen Next?

The Court's affirmance of the lower court's injunction of COPA
was somewhat surprising in light of the narrow class of materials that
COPA prohibits. The statute only reaches material that is obscene as to
minors, which, as Justice Breyer argued in dissent, would cover "little
more" than legally obscene materials which receive no First Amendment
protection.3 7 It is hard to imagine materials that would be legally
obscene to minors but not to adults because any such materials would
have to lack any "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"
for minors and would have to appeal to their "prurient interests., 38 As
Justice Breyer concluded, "one cannot easily imagine material that has
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for a significant
group of adults, but lacks such value for any significant group of

37. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 678 (2004) (Breyer J., dissenting). See
also Robert Corn-Revere, Ashcroft v. ACLU II: The Beat Goes On, 2004 CATO SUP. CT.
REv. 299, 319.
38. See47 U.S.C § 231(e)(6) (2003).
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minors. 39
Despite the narrowness of COPA, the entire Ashcroft Court (except
Justice Scalia) applied strict scrutiny to the statute and required the
government to satisfy the compelling interest test. The holding that the
government could not satisfy this test was somewhat surprising as the
Court had previously ruled that the government could apply a different
obscenity standard to minors than adults,4 ° and all COPA did was add the
word "minor" to the Miller test.4 ' It is hard to imagine a statute affecting
less non-obscene speech than COPA, so unless Congress simply
prohibits all legally obscene speech on the Internet, any effort to draw a
line between protected speech for adults and protected speech for minors
on the Internet is unlikely to succeed.
The Court's decision in Ashcroft that the plaintiffs had shown a
reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits because filters would
be a less restrictive alternative to the criminal sanctions in COPA was
also somewhat surprising. First of all, filters are a voluntary option. It is
unlikely that Congress could constitutionally require filters, or devise a
set of incentives that would entice most parents to use them.42 Moreover,
filtering software is notoriously unreliable.43 Most filters screen out
information that would not be deemed obscene for minors, and allow in
images that probably are. A recent study by the Kaiser Foundation
found, among other weaknesses, that seven filters set at intermediate
levels blocked 27% of health sites related to "condoms. 44 This is a high
price to pay for the limited utility of such filters. Moreover, it is likely
that companies distributing sexually explicit materials may devise ways
to evade such software. If filtering software, with all of these problems,
is a constitutionally required alternative to congressional prohibition of
sexually explicit Internet materials, it is difficult to imagine a regulatory
scheme that would pass constitutional muster. As one commentator has
suggested, "a holding that blocking and filtering software is a less
restrictive means [leaves] Congress utterly impotent to deal with
[indecency on the Internet].'
Not only is it unlikely that Congress could devise a constitutional
39. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 679 (Breyer, J., dissenting), quoted in Corn-Revere, supra
note 37, at 320.
40. See Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
41. § 231(e)(6).
42. Cf United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
(upholding federal law requiring public libraries to use filters to obtain federal funding).
43. See Kate Reder; Ashcroft v. ACLU: Should Congress Try, Try, and Try Again, or
Does the International Problem of Regulating Internet Pornography Require an
InternationalSolution?, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 139, 147-48 (2004).
44. Id. at 148.
45. Wilt, supra note 6, at 423.
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scheme regulating sexually explicit Internet materials, it should not do
so. The Internet provides an unprecedented opportunity for individuals
without great capital to participate in the growth of culture, politics, and
commerce. 46 Moreover, for the first time, people all over the globe can
communicate with and influence other people inside their own homes.
Of course, this tool of mass communication creates dangers, especially to
children.47 To the extent this potential harm arises inside the home,
however, there are significant privacy issues that should deter Congress
from attempting to coercively determine what can and cannot be posted
on the Web.
In Stanley v. Georgia,48 the Supreme Court held that a person could
not be prosecuted for merely possessing obscenity inside his house.4 9
The Court summarized the defendant's argument as follows: "He is
asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy
his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He
is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his
library." 50 The Court agreed with the defendant:
[If] the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books
he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the5 1 thought of giving government the power to
control men's minds.
Although the Court has never held that there is a concomitant right to
bring obscene materials inside the home, the advent of the Internet
should lead to the expansion of the Stanley protections.52 Any regulation
of Internet material will leave its greatest mark on what people choose to
view inside their own homes.53 Although radio and television regulation
46. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom Expressionfor the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (2004).
47. See Sarah B. Evans, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil, See No Evil: Protectingthe
Nation's Children From Sexually Explicit Materialon the Internet, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REv. 253, 253-256 (2003).
48. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
49. Id. at 568.
50. Id. at 565.
51. Id. The idea that the government should not place itself between citizens and
what they do in the privacy of their own homes was recently reaffirmed when the Court
invalidated Texas' law prohibiting same-sex sodomy. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 567 (2003).
52. See Deborah Milham, The Constitutional Issues Presented by the
Communications Decency Act's Application to HIVIAIDS Information on the Internet, 8
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 195, 197 (1997).
53. To the extent Congress is concerned about public places such as libraries and
schools, where the right to privacy is greatly diminished, Congress has ample means
short of criminal penalties and outright censorship to achieve its goals. See, e.g., United
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also affects the First Amendment rights of people at home, the ubiquitous
nature of the Internet and its potential to provide much-needed
information in virtually every area of social, economic and political life
make the stakes of overbroad regulation much higher than for traditional
media sources. A teenager seeking information about AIDS or birth
control should be able to do so without government censorship.
Although the potential for that teenager to access sexually explicit
materials is serious, in the long run, the responsibility for solving that
problem must rest with parents and not government overseers. As the
Court discussed in Ashcroft, Congress and parents working together to
voluntarily prevent children from accessing harmful Internet materials is
a solution more consistent with First Amendment values than a system of
54
coercive sanctioning of protected speech.
Another problem with congressional regulation of sexually explicit
materials on the Internet is that, even though the Court has upheld the
"community standards" part of COPA against a facial challenge,5 5 this
part of the Miller test as applied creates insurmountable problems. As
Professor Cenite has argued persuasively:
Regulating online obscenity by geographically determined local
community standards imposes high burdens on content providers
serving wide audiences to know multiple, vague local standards. In
addition, because controlling geographic distribution of explicit
content online is not practical, standards of the least tolerant
community would likely prevail, limiting content available
nationally. A national standard, though preferable to multiple local
standards, raises definitional and constitutional questions; if it is a
national average standard, it would restrict material acceptable in
communities with above average tolerance, resulting in some
overbreadth. Alternatively, a minimal national standard would
eliminate overbreadth by embracing
only what would be considered
56
obscene throughout the nation.
It is one thing to require distributors of sexually explicit movies,
books, and magazines to conform to the standards of the communities in
which they inject their wares. But both local and national regulation of
the Internet on the basis of moral disapproval carries tremendous costs.
Most of First Amendment doctrine involves the balancing of free speech
interests with legitimate, sometimes compelling, governmental interests.
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding Congress' use of the
spending power to require filters in public libraries).
54. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004).
55. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
56. Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity Law as an
Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 25 (2004).
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In the case of the Internet, the most communicative device ever invented,
the risks of both local parochial judgments and overreaching national
legislation make the costs of governmental regulation too high. If young
children and teenagers are accessing inappropriate Internet materials, the
better answer lies with parents, schools, and libraries, not governmental
censorship and coercion.
III.

Conclusion

New technologies bring new challenges. Sometimes advances are
incremental and sometimes they are revolutionary. The Internet has
dramatically changed the way people communicate with each other,
conduct commerce, and even participate in politics. It has also altered
the landscape for the viewing and purchasing of sexually explicit
materials and provided information about sex that is important and
valuable. Distinguishing the former from the latter should not be the job
of government bureaucrats, judges, or juries. The near universal
availability of the Internet, as well as its prominent place in the home,
makes both state and national regulation troubling as a matter of policy
and difficult as a constitutional matter. The freedom of speech is too
important, and the Internet too vast and useful, for the government to
dictate policy.

